government lacks the authority and resources to govern as a result of the division of labor between state and the marketplace in liberal democratic societies.
In the past 20 years, many regimes were suggested based on urban development experiences in the United States. Stone (1987) analyzed urban development in Atlanta and found corporate, progressive, and caretaker regimes in urban development in the city. Fainstein and Fainstein (1983) revealed directive, concessionary, and conserving regimes, respectively, functioning in the 1950s, the 1960s, and after 1974 in U.S. cities. Judd (2000) suggested revival and partisan regimes from the 1980s to the 1990s. In a more general approach, Elkin (1987) postulated three defining axes to analyze urban politics: public and private growth alliances, electoral politics, and bureaucratic politics. Recently, some scholars have reconstructed the "traditional" regime theory by combining it with the regulationist theory (Lauria 1997) or by introducing new factors such as growth control programs into regime modeling (Logan, Whaley, and Crowder 1997; Logan and Zhou 1989; Warnken 1999) . Other scholars have redefined the theory by emphasizing the importance of the internal logic of city politics rather than external pressures in coalition leadership construction (Judd 2000) .
Although most researchers have applied regime theory in U.S. cities, the goal of regime analysis is to investigate urban governance in a more general sense. Regime theory intends to answer one question: "How and under what conditions do different types of governing coalitions emerge, consolidate, and become hegemonic or devolve and transform?" (Lauria 1997, 1-2) . This governance question and the relationship of government and various interest groups exist not only in capitalist countries but also in other societies. Therefore, the research question about the relationship between local government and other interest groups on urban development in a socialist society may have theoretical significance. Can we apply the concepts of regime theory in a socialist society in which the public sector controls most political and economical resources? If there is also a pro-growth coalition in a socialist society, how does it differ from one in a capitalist society? A study of a socialist case may make contributions to regime theory from a comparative perspective. With a shortage of empirical research on development coalitions in socialist societies, this study may fill the gap by providing a case in Shanghai, China.
However, there are difficulties in applying regime theory to a socialist society. In analyzing urban governance, the model employed in a liberal democratic society should be different from one in a socialist country such as China. Stone's (1987 Stone's ( , 1993 ) conception of power is based on a social production model, which emphasizes the ability of actors within a regime to mobilize resources. But in China, where there is a strong government, a social control model, wherein actors have direct power over others, may be more appropriate. In addition, Stone's conception of regimes emphasizes the privileged role exercised by business, but in China, government of various levels often takes leadership. Is regime theory applicable in a Chinese case?
On the other hand, there are reasons suggesting the applicability of regime theory as a framework to analyze urban governance in Chinese cities, at least in part. First, China is in transition. Many evidences contend that the public sector has gradually lost control over resource allocation so it has to approach nonpublic sectors (foreign investors, managers of enterprises of various ownership, etc.) in securing economic development. Although the public sector is still the strongest stakeholder, the trends of a shrinking state and a growing marketplace in production indicate a changing economic relationship between the state and nonpublic sectors, which in turn suggests the applicability of regime concepts. Second, there are various types and levels of "the state" in Chinese cities. In north China, the public sector does dominant most resources. But in the south, it is the marketplace that controls most resources, and local government has to work with the nonpublic sectors in governance. A typical case is the Pearl River Delta region, where cities such as Dongguang are obviously governed by a coalition of city government and nonpublic resource controllers, a situation very much like what happens in U.S. cities. In Shanghai, where both the local government and the marketplace have been well developed, the status of city governance is in between the north and south model. Third, although the government may still be a leading power at the municipal level, at the urban district level, market forces may have a much stronger influence in formulating a development agenda, and many development activities actually take place at the district level. The state may have "direct power over others" on political issues, but it no longer has the power over other actors on economic issues. Therefore, from the political perspective, regime concepts may look difficult to adopt, but from an economics perspective, basic elements of regime theory can still be found in Chinese cities. It is in this sense that regime theory is applied in the Shanghai case.
Shanghai was selected for several reasons. As the largest city in China with a total population of 14 million in 1998, Shanghai has grown significantly in the 1980s and the 1990s during the reform era. The city's urban district has expanded by 1,563%, and urban population has increased by 69.4% in 17 years (Shanghai Statistics Bureau [SSB] 1998a). The rapid growth of the city provides a typical case of urban development in China and shows all positive and negative outcomes of urban growth. Data availability and accessibility are other considerations for the selection. Very few Chinese cities have provided details on displacement as Shanghai has, for example. Because displacement and relocation are common phenomena in many Chinese cities, the Shanghai experience can be used as a critical indicator in measuring negative redevelopment outcomes in China.
Employing concepts of coalition building and using displacement cases in Shanghai's rapid urban growth, this research studies the relationship between urban regimes and urban redevelopment outcomes measured by population redistribution through relocation. Motivation and consequences of redeveloping Shanghai reveal the characteristics of a socialist regime featuring successful government intervention, active business cooperation, limited community participation, and uneven distribution of benefits and costs of new developments.
Information used in this study was mainly collected in interviews in the summers of 1998 and 1999. Seventeen government officials and planners provided insights on the motivation and means of redevelopment of the pro-growth coalition. Fourteen urban residents (a relatively small sample because of various constraints) who had been displaced and relocated shared experiences about displacement. Secondary data come from official publications, including the Shanghai Statistical Yearbook and other reports.
I start from a brief summary of main concepts of the regime theory, followed by a description of urban development in China in general and Shanghai in particular. Using regime theory as a framework, I then analyze features of pro-growth regimes in Shanghai before and after the reforms. The conclusion section displays main findings and implications of findings.
MAIN CONCEPTS OF URBAN REGIME THEORY
In a liberal democratic society, the fundamental challenge facing local government is the conflict between public power and private resource ownership. Thus, a coalition of local government, which represents the elected public authority, and business groups, which control major development resources, often forms in urban governance. Regime, as the informal arrangements that surround and complement the formal workings of governmental authority to mobilize resources, is needed to mediate conflicts (Stone 1993) .
Two assumptions define the mechanism of regime building. First, the state role is broadly determined by its relations to production. This relationship determines the state's need of the private sector as a partner in governing cities because it is the private sector that controls production in liberal democratic societies. At the local level, because local revenue depends heavily on property tax, local government has to enhance existing property investment and attract more such investment. The consequence has been a pro-growth coalition composed of the local government and business interest groups, especially the real estate industry. Second, state behavior may be affected by three sets of forces: capitalist interests, political organizations, and urban social movements (Fainstein and Fainstein 1983) . Although capitalist interest is at the center of regime building, there are constraints to the governing coalition, especially residents' voting power affected by political organizations and social movements. These constraints may limit the state's informal arrangement with business groups in regime building. Here, contours of local politics, including the composition of a city's economy, political structure, cultural tradition, and history of the city, are critical to local coalitions, although external pressures such as the movement of capital and changes in national social and urban policies play important roles (Judd 2000) . Although the federal government is always a player in regime building, local government, the private sector (business interest groups, especially the real estate industry), and community power (community organizations, social movements, and racial and political forces) are more directly involved at the local level. It is the dynamic interaction of the four parties that has formulated various regimes in urban redevelopment. The different motivations and partnership combinations bring about different urban development policies with varying outcomes. Using these concepts of the theory, we may examine urban development activities in China and Shanghai.
Before applying the theory in the Chinese context, however, some important social-economic differences between China and the United States should be emphasized. First, in China, a socialist country, public ownership dominated production before the reforms. Now, the Chinese constitution allows various ownership forms; about 40% of the nation's economic activities are within the hands of nonpublic sectors, and the share is increasing (China Statistics Bureau [CSB] 1999). Still, the marketplace, reborn after the reforms, is weaker compared to that in developed nations. A weak private sector may be less influential in a coalition. Second, Chinese officials, from the president to mayors, are not elected but rather are assigned through a complicated political system, although, formally, national and local legislators are elected. Electoral power is thus less a factor in local politics. The weakness of electoral power contributes directly to the third feature of local politics in China: Civil society is still in its early stage in terms of public participation and involvement in local affairs. This is rooted partly in the Chinese traditional culture of deference to authority. All these differences make the conditions of coalition building in Shanghai different from those found in U.S. cities.
URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA AND SHANGHAI

URBAN DEVELOPMENT AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
As a developing country, China is far behind industrialized nations in many aspects, including urban development. By 1980, less than 20% (19.6%) of the total population lived in urban areas, and the investment in urban development was very limited. Since the economic reforms in urban areas, however, China has experienced rapid urbanization accompanied by economic growth (the average economic growth rate was about 10% in the 1990s). Urban population increased to 34% (397 million) in 1998, and the number of cities grew from 381 in 1987 to 668 in 1998, an increase of 75.3% in a decade (CSB 1999) .
Speeding up urbanization is the urban policy of the current government, which contrasts with the anti-urban policy in Mao's era. As a result, largescale redevelopment projects from infrastructure improvement to commercial and housing developments have been implemented in all Chinese cities since the 1980s. Large cities, such as Shanghai and Beijing, are generators of economic growth and have attracted more investment from both international corporations and domestic investors that are seeking better returns in large cities. Urban development and redevelopment projects in large cities have thus been stimulated. Although China's official urban policy promotes development of small cities and discourages the growth of large cities, the central government has taken a laissez-faire attitude toward further expansion of large cities in practice, recognizing their contributions to the national economy. Statistics reveal that the expansion of urbanized areas of large cities was faster than that of other cities, indicating that more development activities have taken place in large cities. On the other hand, the population of small cities has increased faster than that of large ones in recent years, a reflection of the official urban policy (see Table 1 ).
With decentralization after reforms, the central government has adopted policies of tax sharing and sharing development decision power with local government. The motivation has been to improve government efficiency and promote local economic growth. In general, Chinese cities are now shaped by local government rather than by the central authority, contrasting sharply with the central-predominant system in the prereform era.
URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN SHANGHAI
Shanghai was, and still is, the most advanced city in China economically, physically, and, to a certain extent, politically. Experienced as a colony for about a century, Shanghai received a variety of influences from and built various channels to the outside world. Its physical appearance shows an apparent Western style. People of the city are famous for their entrepreneurship, even after immigrating to other places. Many people are involved in various forms of civic organizations, and the number of civic associations in the city is much higher than the national average (Pei 1998) . But under the planned economy, with the central government's ideological bias toward the city (as a "Westernized city"), Shanghai's infrastructure upgrading needs were ignored, and its function was simply "generating revenue for the whole nation" (Yeung and Sung 1996) . For more than 20 years, this single city with a population of only 1% of the nation supplied a sixth of the national revenue, and reinvestment was very limited (SSB 1987) . The result was a much out-of-date infrastructure system, from urban housing to city streets, because of the severe shortage of investment in urban development for 40 years.
With economic growth-oriented reforms, the central government realized the mistake and wanted to better use the economic potential of the city. More important, Shanghai was viewed as a competitor or substitute for Hong Kong in negotiating the return of Hong Kong with the United Kingdom. To the central government, Shanghai, with its worldwide connections and its entrepreneurship all similar to Hong Kong, could replace Hong Kong as China's gateway to the world, and Hong Kong's benefits from the position of China's gateway city would then be lost should the British not accept China-favored conditions.
The Dynamic Relationship Between the Central and the Municipal Government
After the central government took almost all revenue from the city for 40 years, the central government approved a tax-sharing system to allow a larger share (25%) of tax revenue to Shanghai in 1988. The central government also encouraged the city's initiatives on large-scale infrastructure and redevelopment projects, especially the development of the Pu-dong New District in 1990. In most of the redevelopment projects, direct investment from the central government was limited, although some ministries did invest in the construction of commercial buildings. Instead, the central government formulated policies that allowed the municipal government more autonomy in making financial decisions beyond the central planned economy and allowed various domestic funds from other cities or public-owned enterprises to invest in Shanghai. In other words, the central government's involvement in urban redevelopment in Shanghai is relatively indirect, an approach different from the way the federal government functioned in U.S. cities during the urban renewal era.
Three main redevelopment activities have taken place in Shanghai: large-scale infrastructure improvement projects, land preparation for land leasing to foreign investors, and slum clearance and housing programs since the reforms. Although it is easy to understand the rationale of infrastructure and housing projects, a discussion is needed on the land-leasing strategy. In China, many productive resources-land, financial institutions, and a large share of factories and buildings-are owned by the public. One consequence of the overwhelming public ownership of production is that property tax has only token meaning in China. Because property tax is actually a charge on the public sector itself, which owns most properties in urban areas, the tax is extremely low. More important, because the major part of tax revenue has to be shared with the central government, a municipal government (as the owner of a large share of local property) is reluctant to impose tax on its own property to avoid the "loss" of local wealth to the central government. Property tax therefore plays a very minor role in local revenue. In Shanghai, the municipal statistical bureau shows no "property tax" item in listing local revenue sources in its annual statistical yearbook. The city of Beijing lists "property-related tax" (including property tax and other land-related taxes) as a source of local revenue, but the amount is small. For instance, the 1992 fiscal report of the government of Beijing reveals that the amount of all land-use and property-related tax was 60.7 million yuan (about $7.6 million), which was 5.9% of local tax revenue or 3.6% of the total revenue (including tax and other incomes) in the year. In 1993, the amount increased to 76.3 million yuan (about $9.5 million), but it was still only 5% of the local tax revenue or 4.7% of the total revenue (Beijing Statistics Bureau [BSB] 1993 [BSB] , 1994 .
The minor role of property tax in local revenue indicates that although local government does support real estate development in Chinese cities, property tax as an economic gain to local revenue may not be the main motivation. Land-leasing income, on the other hand, has played an important role in local revenue. From 1988 to 1997, the Shanghai municipal government leased 138.63 square km of land for a total land-leasing income of 24 billion yuan ($3 billion). On average, land-leasing income was 11.2% of local revenue every year from 1988 to 1997 (based on calculation of data from SSB 1998b from SSB , 1999 . This is a much larger share of local revenue than taxes represent. Moreover, land-leasing income is a local income that does not have to be shared with the central government (although it remains a controversial topic between the central and local governments). Therefore, from an economic perspective, leasing more land can bring more revenue to the city. This is, of course, a main motivation for the pro-growth policy. But since the central government tightened regulation over land leasing (for the sake of cultivated land protection) in 1998, the amount of land leased has been reduced, and so has the importance of land-leasing income. Since then, more land leasing has taken place within the built-up area where the land supply is limited. This new land policy has brought higher pressure on the reuse and redevelopment of the existing built area, the implication being that more urban residents have to be displaced or relocated to give room to redevelopment projects. Here we may find a dynamic interaction between the central and local government and the consequences of the dynamic to residents.
The Changing Relationship of the Municipal Government and Nonpublic Sectors
The reforms have been changing the relationship of the municipal government and nonpublic sectors. Although public ownership is still the main form in China's economy, the nonpublic sectors are growing. Various forms of nonpublic ownership today include collective owned, private owned, share holding, sole foreign ownership, joint owned (by nonstate domestic owners), and joint ventures (with foreign partners). These nonpublic companies are rapidly replacing state-owned enterprises. owned (from 2.8% to 8.8%), Hong Kong/Taiwan funded (from 3.6% to 15.2%), and foreign funded (from 10.6% to 35.5%) all increased significantly. GOV of foreign-funded enterprises (200.9 billion yuan) alone contributed more than state-owned enterprises did (130.3 billion yuan). It is clear that the public sector no longer dominates production-not even holds the major part of it. In a city with half of its gross domestic product (GDP) depending on manufacturing industry, the change of shares in industrial production is crucial. Facing more than 75% of industry production held by nonpublic sectors, the municipal government has to seek partners from nonpublic-owned industries in making development decisions. According to regime theory, the need for coalition building emerges. More evidence of the rise of nonpublic sectors is found in the investment in infrastructure projects. From 1990 to 1998, 180 billion yuan ($22 billion) had been invested in infrastructure improvement projects in Shanghai. Among that 180 billion yuan, the Shanghai municipal government and the central government together invested only 18 billion yuan ($2.2 billion), or 10% of the total. Ninety percent of the investment came from nongovernment financial resources, including foreign loans and foreign direct investment (Zhao 2001) . Again, parties other than the public sector have become stakeholders, so the municipal government has to take their interests into account in formulating development agenda. High-tech industry, some traditional industries, retail business, and real estate groups have an important influence on the government's development plans. A detailed discussion is provided in next section.
Within the City: The Rising Power of Urban District
Within the city, local political and administrative structure matters, as pointed out by Judd (2000) . Officially, the city has three administration levels in its urban area: the municipal government, urban districts (a district may have more than 1 million population; the largest district in Shanghai has 1.6 million population), and "street offices" (subdistrict governments, with a size approximate to a community in U.S. cities). Among the three types of development activities, infrastructure projects are mainly a municipal responsibility, land preparation for leasing is initiated by both the municipal and district governments, and slum clearance/housing projects are basically under the control of district governments and implemented by street offices.
Urban districts and street offices were ignored in making urban development decisions before the reforms because it was the central governmentnot even the municipal government-that planned and funded most development projects. After decentralization, both fiscal and land management authorities were switched to government of lower levels. With the authority of managing local revenue and land, urban district government has emerged as a key role in shaping community landscape. Not only have pro-growth policies been adopted, but many district governments themselves have also become business partners with real estate and other business companies, although under various names because the central government bans the administrative body to be involved in business. In Shanghai, both governments in the Luwan and Xuhui Districts are well known for their ability to attract investment.
The Governing Coalition, Its Development Policy, and Motivation
Having received a larger share of tax revenue and the freedom of decision making after the reforms, the municipal government became ambitious and tried to return to Shanghai's position as an "international city" and the "dragon head" of China's economy. Improvements of infrastructure, housing, and slum clearance are viewed as critical not only to city residents but also to potential foreign investors. Attracting foreign investment through urban land provision is a key strategy of economic development. Along this line, many aggressive pro-growth policies, including tax incentives to investors, deregulation on land-use control, and provision of infrastructure funded by public financing, have been formulated and implemented.
In general, the government has achieved its redevelopment goals. The total area of urban districts increased by 1,563%, and the urban population increased by 69.4% in about 10 years. The municipal government was proud of its accomplishments in the city's transportation system with the completion of the Number 1 and Number 2 subways, three bridges across the Huang-pu River, a new elevated expressway system connecting the whole city, a light-transit system, and a new international airport ("the largest in Asia") in 10 years. In the sense of material improvement, there has been obvious progress in people's daily lives. All of these show impressive urban growth, as summarized in Table 3 .
In housing construction alone, 39.8 billion yuan ($4.9 billion) was invested from 1987 to 1997, which raises the per capita housing area from 6.2 square meters in 1987 to 9.3 square meters in 1997. Given the growth of the urban population from 7.2 million in 1987 to 10.0 million in 1997, this is a significant accomplishment. With these achievements, Shanghai has been cited as a national "role model" of urban development.
Behind the decisions of these large-scale development projects, there are multiple purposes and motivations. To city leaders, the motivation has been "to show capability" to the national leaders. In China, being a national role model means the municipal government gains a high status in the political system. Two Shanghai government leaders, Wu Bang-guo and Huang Ju (both were deputy mayors), have been promoted to the central government and have become national leaders since 1992. In the city, the director of Huang-pu District, Chen Liang-yu, has been promoted as the executive deputy mayor of Shanghai, based on his achievements in urban redevelopment in the district. To the manufacturing industry, large construction projects mean business and employment. Shanghai has been one of China's largest steel and shipbuilding industry bases since the 1950s. Facing high competition from steel and shipbuilding industries in both the international and domestic markets, the Shanghai municipal government uses infrastructure projects to support these industries. The bridges, subway and light-transit systems, and more than 2,900 high-rise buildings all generate demand to the steel and shipbuilding (now producing steel frames for bridges and high-rise buildings) companies. To international financial institutions, large development projects in China save their business when other Asian countries struggle in financial crisis, so the demand for their service is low. Similar to the U.S. cases, the same players-local government, manufacturing companies, and financial institutions-form coalitions to promote growth. (1988, 1998a, 1998b ).
The Cost: Displacement and the Missing Player-Community Power
Such impressive growth has its costs socially and economically. The most severe social cost is the displacement and relocation of residents. This study uses displacement as a critical indicator in measuring the negative outcomes of redevelopment because in many cases, people's relocation takes place under direct or indirect pressure, although some residents have moved voluntarily. The significance of the problem can be viewed from two perspectives.
First is the scope of relocation and displacement. Displacement and relocation in Shanghai are much larger than that in the urban renewal period in U.S. cities. Table 4 shows the amount of displaced and relocated urban households and residents in Shanghai from 1991 to 1997. Over 1.5 million residents-more than half the population of the city of Chicago-have been relocated in just eight years. Although Chinese cities are more populated, the proportion of residents relocated is remarkably high. The fact is, every one out of six of the city's urban residents (9 million in 1998) has been relocated in the past several years. In the United States, displacement in urban redevelopment projects has affected relatively fewer residents. Even in some typical cases (such as the South Armour Square case in Chicago in which an AfricanAmerican community was damaged by the construction of Comisky Park baseball stadium and 16% of the housing stock was demolished), the (1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) ; Shanghai Social Science Institute (1997). a. Because the accurate number of residents displaced was not released, the number of residents is the product of the number of households by the average family size of the year. Because most families displaced lived in slum or low-quality shelters, their family size is usually larger than the city average, which means that the actual number of residents relocated may even larger than the number from the calculation.
proportion of the population affected was relatively smaller. This difference is in part due to the difference in population density and economic conditions of Shanghai and U.S. cities, but more important, it is largely due to the civil rights movement in U.S. cities through which community power was built. The second perspective is the social reaction to displacement and relocation. According to a 1997 government report, complaints about displacement remained number one of all official appeals in Shanghai from 1992 to 1994 (Shanghai Social Sciences Institute [SSSI] 1997). Interviewees related cases in which those who were forced to move had taken more serious actions, even suicide, in protesting against displacement. Strikes or demonstrations on the street were a more common way to show people's anger over forced displacement. Although these cases were not reported openly in China, the government felt the crisis. To respond, the municipal government set up a task force to focus on displacement; the outcome is the 1997 official report, "The Problem of Displacement" (SSSI 1997) . The report showed the gravity of the problem and discussed impacts on displaced residents, the housing market, and the administrative system (such as power abuse and corruption). The authors suggested that local government at various levels, especially publicowned development companies, should take more responsibility. Here we should stop to discuss the land development process and the land market in Shanghai.
In Shanghai as in other Chinese cities, there are currently three levels of land market: the primary land market, secondary land market, and property exchange market. The primary land market, which includes land of nonurban uses or existing urban land to be redeveloped, is strictly controlled by the public sector. Public-owned development companies, established by local government (municipal and district) with public money, dominate the primary market by acquiring and selling land to developers. Developers build and sell properties (together with the land-use rights) to users in the secondary market. Individual users then transfer properties and/or use rights at the property exchange market.
To residents who experienced displacement, the real "bad guys" are development companies that tear down their homes to make room for high-profit new uses and street offices that help development companies by using administrative power in relocation. There are both private and quasi-public development companies. Although funded by public money, quasi-public development companies are established under the name of "independent business." There are reasons why local government adopts the practice. First, the central government bans formal involvement of government in business for the sake of anti-corruption. On the other hand, local officials feel the pressure of "improving revenue" from the top, and land is the main resource under local control, so selling land is the main strategy to generate revenue. The quasi-public format is viewed as a safe way to generate revenue without "direct involvement" in business in meeting both expectations of anti-corruption and economic growth. Second, public officials may be insulated from direct responsibility for any adverse impacts in a quasi-public entity, but they can claim credit from urban renewal projects. This is exactly what Stone (1993) explained in discussing "quasi-private entities" in U.S. urban politics, with only one variation: It is the government that takes leadership and nonpublic sectors follow.
Street offices, as the lowest level government, have to execute decisions (such as relocation) made by high-level government and confront complaints of residents. Staff of street offices have mixed feelings in carrying out the relocation policy: They themselves may be relocated, but they also share benefits from redevelopment. As a result, some of them may form opposition coalitions with individual residents in pushing development companies to give better terms to residents, but the majority as members of the governing coalition may actively force residents to move out in the name of "eminent domain" or "public interest."
There are multiple players in the real estate business. Table 5 reveals sources of investment funds in real estate developments in Shanghai in 1996. It shows a share of 23.6% "other" funds (domestic nonbudgetary funds, including domestic private investment and collective construction funds from collective-owned enterprises) plus a share of 6.3% foreign investment, for a total of about 29.9% of investment from nonpublic sectors. The share of "government budgetary" funds approved by the central government, a legacy of the planned economy, was very minor (0.7%), which reflects the fiscal consequence of the decentralization reform. Main investment funds came directly or indirectly from local government (quasi-public development companies borrowed money from banks, plus institutions and enterprises under various ownership; this investment is listed as "self-raised capital" in Table 5 ).
Although we see many players in the real estate industry, communitybased institutions are missing. This indicates the economic and political weakness of community organization in urban development activities.
Although nonpublic sectors are active economically, they still remain weak politically. The authoritarian regime has loosened much control over economic activities but not much on political issues. We have seen the emergence of local organizations (such as business and property owners associations), but community participation is still at its early stage in Shanghai and other Chinese cities. The weakness of community power is largely the result of the public servant assignment system, as mentioned earlier, and it makes communities unable to react efficiently against negative development outcomes, such as displacement. Local government is still the strongest among the main four parties: the central and local governments, the marketplace, and the community power. A strong local government makes it easier to defeat any opposition, including protests from communities against displacement. This explains not only why the scope of displacement was large and the impacts were severe but also why less has happened in stopping displacement.
DISCUSSION: PRO-GROWTH COALITIONS IN A SOCIALIST SOCIETY
The two hypotheses of regime theory-local politics revolves around land development and is dominated by a pro-growth coalition, and urban future is shaped by this coalition's molding of local policy-seem to be true in the socialist context in general, but with some variations. To identify features of pro-growth coalitions in the socialist city, we should further analyze roles of the four parties engaged in urban redevelopment. Different combinations of these actors form different regimes in different periods.
THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Before the reforms of the 1980s, the central government directly planned and implemented most redevelopment projects in cities. The central-planned system ensured the central government's control over most resources, from funding to land acquisition. It was the central government that took the leadership of a pro-growth coalition composed of government bodies at all levels Zhang / PRO-GROWTH: SHANGHAI 491 in the absence of the private sector and community organizations. That coalition was heavily centralized and reflected the central state power. Since the reforms, the central government has significantly reduced its direct involvement in local redevelopment projects. However, it still holds critical power and indirectly affects local development issues. First, key local officials (mayors of large cities, governors of provinces) are still appointed by the central government instead of elected by local residents. The Chinese administration system is still a centralized bureaucracy, and showing loyalty to higher government is crucial for promotion. The central government judges the performance of local officials based on two criteria: political conformity to the central government and achievements in local economic development. This mechanism has caused local officials to pay more attention to what the central government would like to see rather than what the city really needs. Large-scale infrastructure projects are viewed favorably by the central government, and new buildings, streets, and bridges are more visible to higher officials who supervise local performance. Because the development of the Pu-dong New District was initiated by senior leader Deng Xiaoping and the central government, the project received strong support from the municipal government. Although three large bridges to the New District have been completed in the past 10 years, another new bridge is under construction.
The second leverage the central government uses in curbing local development is the national urban policy. For example, the cultivated land preservation policy of 1998 has forced local government to curtail leasing farmland and to switch to redeveloping existing built areas, both of which contributed to displacement. In recent years, the central government has launched several important policies related to urban development, such as speeding up urbanization by promoting the development of small towns and villages and urban housing reform policies. In general, all local governments follow these policies and adjust local agendas accordingly. "To show higher level government whatever they want to see" is a common strategy employed by local officials seeking promotion.
The central government is sensitive to national economic performance and expresses its concerns through national policies. Facing overinvestment in urban redevelopment projects and high inflation rates from 1992 to 1997, the central government had tried to slow down the speed of local development. The 1998 farmland conversion regulation, which recentralizes certain land-use power to the central and provincial governments, is one of the policies to retain central control. Since 1998, however, large-scale infrastructure projects have been resumed because slow economic growth has become a main concern to the central government, and these projects have been used to stimulate growth. The various policies reflect the dynamic nature of the central-local relationship, although both central and local governments are members of the pro-growth coalition.
Local government had to follow the central government and had limited control over local revenue before reforms. But it did not give up the hope of receiving better terms from the central government. In Shanghai, after experiencing interest conflicts between the nation (which required more local revenue) and the city (which tried to retain all local revenue), the municipal government mobilized local residents, including community groups, to express, in various ways, the city's compliance on revenue-sharing arrangement. Finally, in 1990, Shanghai was able to push the central government to change the arrangement (Yeung and Sung 1996) . Struggles of this kind took place also in other cities. But it was local government's insistence that pushed the central government to reform the tax-sharing policy.
Local government has become the key stakeholder in urban development and leader of the pro-growth coalition since decentralization in 1990. Both financial autonomy and land-use authority have been devolved to local government. Two considerations motivate a municipal government in facilitating urban growth: exhibiting achievements to the central government and promoting economic development to serve interest groups and the constituency. As mentioned earlier, the pressure of showing better performance to the central government is the result of the Chinese administration system's promotion policies, and it always gets high priority in local officials' decision making. Shanghai is a good example. As the largest city and the economic center of China, Shanghai knows how sensitive its performance can be to the nation. For many years, the mayor served as a representative of the central government to supervise the operation of the city, rather than represent the interests of the city. This explains why the city had to submit 87% of its local revenue to the central government for 40 years. The relationship of the mayor and the central government is relevant to the city's development. Shortage of redevelopment funds contributed directly to the poor infrastructure of the "richest city in China" because the then mayors Ke Qing-shi and Cao Di-qiou did not stand up to central requests.
On the other hand, if the mayor is promoted to the central government, he may "take care of" the city's interest in many ways. The current president of China, Jiang Ze-min, and the current primer minister, Zhu Rong-ji, both served as mayors of Shanghai in the 1980s and early 1990s. Since they took the top positions in the central government, Shanghai has received various benefits, from better tax-sharing arrangements to having more Shanghai officials take positions in the central government (which means the city has better connections to the central government). In the Chinese system, personnel decisions are often made following the Communist Party chairman's preference. The two current leaders were promoted because of their good performance, especially their political obedience to Deng Xiao-ping, then the chairman. Similarly, while leaders of the municipal government watch the Party's chairman closely, officials of urban districts watch the mayor and the local Party secretary who "give jobs." The appointment and promotion system causes all officials to "look up" to the desires of higher level government rather than "looking down" to needs of community residents because residents do not have the election power as they do in the United States.
THE MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT AND OTHER LOCAL INTEREST GROUPS
Economic growth, as the most important indicator of local performance, is critical both in showing achievement to the central government and in serving local interest groups. With the rapid growth of nonpublic sectors in China's economy, local government has to take their interest into account in defining development goals, especially the interest of foreign investors. Local economic development strategy is a key indicator reflecting preference of coalition partners. In Shanghai, there are "traditional industries" and "high-tech industries." The former includes steel, shipbuilding, automobile, and textile industries, and latter refers to biochemical, telecommunication, and IT industries. Because high-tech industry is viewed as the future of economic development and attracts more foreign investment, these industries have received most-favorite policies, such as low tax and full infrastructure services. Local government treats traditional industries differently. The automobile industry is also "the pet of the government" because of its attraction to foreign investment, including GM. Steel and shipbuilding industries provide many jobs, and their unions are strong; the local government shows its support by providing orders for large infrastructure projects, such as bridges and elevated expressway systems. The textile industry has lost its importance since the economic restructuring in the early 1990s, but it still occupies a large amount of land in the city. The Shanghai government has decided to move the industry to other provinces to give land to high-tech industry and other "profitable" uses. These strategies reveal the local government's intention: building partnerships with foreign investors and strong domestic industry stakeholders through taking care of their interests but ignoring the interests of weaker actors in formulating development policies.
At the urban district level, the tax-sharing mechanism between municipal and district governments has also been reformed, which reinforces district government's capacity in local development. Land management power (land-use permit and construction permit, land-use regulation and planning) has largely been devolved to district government. In addition, district government can mobilize its local administration system directly. In Shanghai, interviewees reported that the entire urban administrative system, from municipal to district and subdistrict (street office) governments, has been involved and mobilized to support redevelopment projects under the name of "promoting economic growth" (Zhang 2000) . District government often forms quasi-government companies in businesses such as retail, hotel, restaurant, and real estate industries with nonpublic sectors. District government takes the same strategy of using quasi-public companies as an umbrella to avoid government involvement in business, which is banned by law. Interests of its business partners are well taken care of, so the coalition not only has an informal arrangement with its members but also has a formal arrangement with nonpublic sectors as business partners.
With growing economic power, nonpublic sectors have gradually joined the "growth machine" but remain as a "little brother" compared to their role in U.S. cases. Within nonpublic sectors, foreign investors as newcomers to urban development have become influential in the coalition. Foreign investment has significantly stimulated urban development and worsened displacement. The Shanghai government received $2.1 billion from foreign investors in land leasing from 1988 to 1997 (SSB 1998b) . Although no data are available for the number of people displaced due to land leasing to foreign companies, an estimated one-third of displacement cases may be related to land leasing (interview with Mr. Gun on May 21, 1998). Local policies-from tax incentives, land provision, and a public-funded infrastructure service to the establishment of a "foreign investors association"-all reveal local government's efforts to recruit foreign investors into the pro-growth coalition.
With no election power to leverage government officials, community groups are the weakest of the four players in urban development in China. They are never members of the coalition, although there are signs of new community organizations emerging, such as property owner associations at subdistrict and neighborhood levels. When the Shanghai government was struggling for better revenue arrangements with the central government, community groups were asked to support the municipal government, but they lost their influence after Shanghai received a favorite arrangement from the central government. Only recently have community organizations started to regain the local government's attention in handling unemployment and other difficult local problems.
The weakness of community power contributes to the lack of effective means of fighting against displacement. Complicated factors are behind the problem. During interviews, most displaced residents said that they had enjoyed better living conditions (larger living space and better neighborhood environment) after relocation, although they had to pay the cost of longer commuting or poorer schools and health care quality in their new neighborhoods. What they complained of most was the process of displacementdevelopment companies forced them to accept agreements with compensation less than the standard set by the central and municipal government-but not the ends of displacement. Some even said that they had expected and welcomed relocation because they could no longer tolerate old houses in slum areas where there were no family kitchens and toilets. They saw relocation as the only way to get rid of poor housing conditions. In a few cases, those who had held important positions or had good connections to decision makers could even make a profit from displacement. A manager of a large state-owned company said that he was able to make several hundred thousand yuan from relocation due to the difference of land price in the old and new locations (interview with Mr. Chen on June 2, 1998). The uneven distribution of burden and benefit of displacement makes it hard to build consensus among residents displaced. Without consensus, community organizations cannot effectively mobilize residents to stop or get a "better deal" in displacement as did U.S. political movements in the urban renewal period.
Lack of nongovernment organizations (NGOs) is another factor. In a socialist country such as China, government manages much of the day-to-day life of a community. NGOs have little room to exist and represent a new concept to many Chinese scholars, even in the postreform era. Community organizations can hardly get technical assistance and support from NGOs, which contributes to these organizations' weakness. Displacement is addressed only by individuals who have suffered in relocation, rather than studied systematically as a social problem to bring it to the public's attention.
CONCLUSION: TWO DIMENSIONS OF COALITION BUILDING AND A SOCIALIST PRO-GROWTH COALITION
Reviewing the history of Shanghai's urban development, it seems that two pro-growth coalitions existed in Shanghai from the 1950s to the 1990s. Before the 1980 reforms, a pro-growth coalition was composed of only governments of various levels. The central government led the coalition, and neither the private sector nor community groups had the chance to join the coalition. In the postreform era, we have seen the emergence of a new coalitioncomposed of local government and nonpublic sectors (international and domestic)-with limited central involvement in development projects and little community participation in decision making.
Because the prereform authoritarian regime contrasts so significantly to pro-growth regimes in U.S. cities, concepts of regime theory might not be applicable. However, the new coalition in Shanghai is similar to the one in the United States in many aspects, so an analysis about similarities and variations of pro-growth coalitions in the Chinese city and in U.S. cities is worthwhile. But before the discussion, an analytical framework should be introduced.
To local government, there are two ultimate goals in building coalitions: to stimulate economic growth and to enhance political legitimacy. These two goals implicate two dimensions of coalition building: the economic dimension and the political dimension. In liberal democratic societies, political legitimacy is displayed through public election and shown in public power, and private ownership forces government to build coalitions with resource controllers for economic growth. The two dimensions could not be separated in liberal democratic societies, but they may be separable in a transitional socialist society such as China. Because public election is not the way to give legitimacy to the government, the political dimension of coalition building is weak in Chinese cities. Moreover, politics is a domestic issue that has received less influence from international society, so local government can declare legitimacy under domestic rules with limited concern about perceptions from the outside world. On the other hand, in a globalized world, international capital has become a key player in economic development, even at the local level. In addition, many nonpublic actors become stakeholders in local economy after decentralization and privatization. The result of these new developments is that the economic dimension of coalition building gets strengthened, and local government has to accept game rules exercising in international society and build coalitions with those who control resources. The difference of the "domestic" political dimension and the "global" economic dimension makes the two separable in coalition building.
From the economic dimension, in both Chinese and U.S. cities, the leadership of a coalition depends largely on the extent to which the leading party controls production resources. In China, before the reforms, the predominant public ownership in production made the public-sector leadership of the pro-growth coalition. In the postreform era, the public sector still controls some key development resources such as land and financial institutions, so it still takes leadership in the coalition. But the growing nonpublic sectors have started to challenge the public sector and force it to build partnerships with new stakeholders in production and to mobilize resources for economic growth, a typical strategy described in regime theory. In the United States, the marketplace often takes leadership in the pro-growth coalition because of predominant private ownership in production, and local government has to build partnerships with the private sector. In this sense, regime theory works well in both cases.
From the political dimension, demonstrating good "political performance" and meeting the desires of higher government are the real concern of local leaders in China because their jobs come from superior officials rather than from local elections, which contrasts to the practice in U.S. cities. Hence, the most important difference between coalition building in the United States and China lies in the political dimension of coalition building-the meaning of public power and political legitimacy in China differs fundamentally from that in the United States. Therefore, a social control model rather than a social production model may work better in analyzing political issues in city governance in China. In this sense, concepts of regime theory, at least part of them, are not applicable.
Community power is the weakest among the four players (the central and local governments, the private sector, and community power) in urban development in both socialist and capitalist societies. In China, a weak community power is the result of community groups' loss of fundamental leverage (election) in urban politics. So the weakness is more with the political dimension in coalition building. In the United States, weak community power is rooted in the lack of control over resources, which is more with the economic dimension of coalition building.
It seems that the situation in China is between a social production model and the social control model because the nation is in transition. Although the social production model might be better in analyzing economic development issues, the social control model may fit well in the political dimension.
